Series · The Emergent Stupidity
A Crowd That Never Meets
Asch needed a room full of people to make us doubt our own eyes. Now a number under a post does it, and we see the crowd's verdict before we form our own.

The room
In the early 1950s, the psychologist Solomon Asch invited college students to what they were told was an experiment in visual judgment. Seven to nine young men sat in two rows of an ordinary classroom. On the ledge of the blackboard stood two white cards: one with a single black line, one with three lines numbered 1, 2, and 3. Each man in turn said aloud which of the three matched the single line.
One of them was the real subject. He sat next to last, so he heard almost everyone before he spoke. He did not know that all the others had met the experimenter beforehand and been told to give the same wrong answer on certain trials.
The first rounds were easy. Then came a card with a line three inches long. The choices were 3¾ inches, 4¼ inches, and 3 inches. The first man said "one." So did the next, and the next.
Asch described the man in the critical seat. He "looks surprised, indeed incredulous," and he may pause before answering, "speak in a low voice," or "smile in an embarrassed way."
Judging alone, Asch's control group erred less than 1 percent of the time. In the room, 36.8 percent of answers on the critical trials went with the wrong majority. About a quarter of the 123 subjects never gave in. Some gave in almost every time.
That is the version we remember. Two parts are usually left out.
First, most answers were still correct. Asch stressed that "the preponderance of estimates" stayed independent of the majority, and reviews of psychology textbooks have found that this half of his finding has been steadily dropped from the story.
Second, in one variation Asch gave the subject a single partner who answered correctly. Errors fell to "one fourth" of their level under a unanimous majority. Even a dissenter who was wrong in a different direction helped: with an extreme dissenter, errors dropped to 9 percent. One voice broke the spell.
Not every replication agrees on that last point. A 2010 Japanese study that used polarizing glasses instead of actors, so that one person honestly saw different lines from the rest, found conformity "almost the same regardless of whether the majority answered unanimously or not." The basic effect keeps returning: a 2023 replication with 210 participants found an error rate of 33 percent.
The question
Part IV of this series was about a room where everyone knew. Asch's subjects could at least see the faces of the people who were wrong. Most of our rooms are gone. So this part asks: what happens to conformity when the crowd never meets, when it exists only as a number under a post, and when each of us sees the crowd's verdict before we have formed our own?
A ranking instead of a room
In 2006, Matthew Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan Watts reported on a music website they had filled with 48 songs by unknown bands. Its 14,341 participants, recruited mostly from a teen-interest website, could listen, rate, and download. Some saw only band and song names. The rest were sorted at random into eight separate "worlds," where they could also see how many times earlier visitors to their world had downloaded each song. In a second experiment, the songs were listed in order of popularity.
Same songs, same starting point, indistinguishable people. Different hits.
Seeing what others chose made success more unequal, so the popular songs got more popular, and less predictable, so the hit in one world could be ordinary in another. The stronger the signal, the stronger both effects. The authors put it in one sentence: "The best songs rarely did poorly, and the worst rarely did well, but any other result was possible."
This is emergence, caught in a lab. No listener chose inequality or chance. Each made a sensible choice: if many people downloaded a song, it is probably worth a listen. Together they built a market whose winners were partly an accident of who arrived first.
In 2013, Lev Muchnik, Sinan Aral, and Sean Taylor reported an experiment on a social news site where readers vote on comments. On more than 100,000 comments, a single up-vote was added at random the moment the comment appeared. That one artificial vote made the next rating 32 percent more likely to be positive and lifted final scores by 25 percent on average. Artificial down-votes tended to be corrected. We push back when the crowd is harsh. We follow it when it is kind.
The three mechanisms, here
Part I set out three mechanisms that systems run: delegation, insulation, and alignment, or what a system offers, what it provides, and what it rewards. A feed runs all three, and here the third one leads.
Alignment: what the feed rewards. A feed rewards moving with the crowd, and it shows the score before we judge. In MusicLab the download count sat beside each song before anyone pressed play; in a feed the count sits under the post before we have read it. Asch found that when subjects could answer in private, errors "dropped markedly." A feed makes nearly every answer public: a like is a vote cast in front of everyone. It rewards speaking early, on everything. The philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt wrote that "Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about," and a feed creates that circumstance every hour. And those who yielded, Asch reported, "seriously underestimated their compliance." Alignment rarely feels like alignment from the inside.
Insulation: what the feed provides. It is not mainly a wall against the other side; the evidence for that, below, is thinner than its fame. What the ranking keeps from arriving is quieter: the slower true story, the dull and accurate post that drew no reactions, and the doubts of everyone who went along. A ranked feed shows the sum of the crowd's reactions and none of the hesitation behind them. The inconvenient fact is usually still out there. It arrives late and small, after the count has settled, when it no longer changes much.
Delegation: what the feed offers. Before a feed asks us to judge anything, it has already judged what deserves our attention. "Trending," "most viewed," and "people also liked" offer to decide what matters, and accepting is the easy path, often the only one on the screen. It is the same sensible shortcut MusicLab's listeners took. But we did not choose these referees. They arrived with the app.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer noticed that stupidity showed up less in people who lived in solitude than in those "inclined or condemned to sociability." A feed is sociability without an off switch.
Why nobody chose it
In 1992, the economists Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch described what they called an informational cascade. It "occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information." Nobody has to want to conform. Copying is rational when others seem to know something. Alignment is the sensible move.
Their sharpest point is what happens next. Once a cascade starts, each new person's choice is "uninformative to others." The count keeps rising, but the information inside it does not. Whatever each person privately doubted never reaches the count: insulation that nobody built. A million likes can hold no more knowledge than the first few choices that set them off. And because cascades form "on the basis of some but very little information," they can be wrong, and they are fragile.
Now add a ranking system that learns from what we react to. In 2.7 million posts from news outlets and members of the US Congress on Facebook and Twitter, Steve Rathje, Jay Van Bavel, and Sander van der Linden found that each word referring to the political out-group raised the odds of a post being shared by 67 percent, whatever the poster's politics. A preregistered audit by Smitha Milli and colleagues found that Twitter's engagement-based ranking amplified emotionally charged, out-group hostile content that users said made them feel worse about the other side, and that they did not prefer. The ranking learns from what we do, not from what we would choose.
The crowd does the rest. Studying stories that spread on Twitter from 2006 to 2017, Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral found that falsehoods were 70 percent more likely to be retweeted than the truth, and that true stories took about six times as long to reach 1,500 people. Bots spread true and false news at the same rate. The authors' conclusion is uncomfortable: false news spreads more "because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it." Their sample was stories fact-checkers chose to investigate; a separately checked sample showed the same pattern.
Here the evidence turns mixed. The fear that algorithms wall us into separate realities has less support than its fame suggests. A 2022 Reuters Institute review found echo chambers "much less widespread than is commonly assumed" and "no support for the filter bubble hypothesis." When researchers working with Meta moved consenting users to chronological feeds for three months during the 2020 US election, time on the platforms fell, but polarization did not change significantly. That study needed the platform's permission, and its independent observer titled his assessment "Independence by permission." In a study published in 2025, a team working without platform cooperation re-ranked the X feeds of 1,256 people for ten days during the 2024 US campaign. Turning posts expressing antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity up or down moved feelings toward the other party by more than 2 points on a 100-point scale, with no detectable differences across party lines. Small, but causal.
My reading: the clearest effect is not that the feed hides the other side. It shows us the score first. That is Asch's room without the faces, and without the moment when you look down the row and notice that one person disagrees.
More and more
Asch's majority was real people who had been told what to say. The next step online is a majority that is not people at all.
In 2025, according to NBC News, researchers from the University of Zurich posted more than 1,000 AI-generated comments on Reddit's r/changemyview forum from accounts posing as people, including a trauma counselor, without users' knowledge or consent. Reddit's chief legal officer called it "highly unethical," and the researchers decided not to publish. In early 2026, Moltbook, billed as a social network for AI agents, claimed 1.5 million registered agents; the security firm Wiz found only about 17,000 human owners behind them and "no mechanism to verify whether an 'agent' was actually AI or just a human with a script." MIT Technology Review called it "AI theater." In January 2026, 22 researchers warned in Science that swarms of AI agents are "capable of coordinating autonomously, infiltrating communities, and fabricating consensus efficiently." I traced the security side of synthetic consensus in Part V of Our New, Global Panopticon.
The emergent risk is simple. For most of history, a crowd was costly evidence: a thousand people in a square meant a thousand people had come. A count online was a cruder trace, but still a trace of other minds. If the appearance of a crowd costs almost nothing to make, the count stops being evidence of people at all. That leaves two easy failures: trusting the numbers, which is alignment with a crowd that does not exist, or trusting nothing, which is insulation we build ourselves and call sophistication.
How much synthetic crowds move real opinion is not yet well measured: the Zurich results were never published, and Moltbook's machines were largely people with scripts. Run the trend five or ten years, though, and the cost of faking agreement keeps falling while our habit of reading the count first stays the same.
Better designs exist. A preprint on Birdwatch, Twitter's crowd-written fact-checking notes, describes "bridging-based ranking": surfacing notes that "appeal broadly across heterogeneous user groups" rather than those that win the most reactions. People who saw such notes were less likely to reshare the post. A ranking can reward agreement among people who usually disagree, which is closer to Asch's partner than to his majority.
Noticing it
The Three Checks, for the number under the post:
- The delegation check. Whose verdict am I reading? Did I decide this matters, or did "trending" decide for me before I looked?
- The insulation check. What has the ranking kept from me? Have I looked for the reply, the correction, the post nobody reacted to, or am I judging only what arrived first?
- The alignment check. Would I still like this if the count were zero? Would I say the opposite out loud if I were the only one?
And the Scale Question: if everyone shared the way I just did, quickly and on the strength of the count, what would the count measure? Only the first few people who decided.
One practice: count the minds, not the clicks. Before a number persuades you, ask how many people behind it judged for themselves, and how many only saw the number. If you cannot tell, treat a million as a handful.
Be the partner
Asch also wrote a line that is easy to miss: "consensus, to be productive, requires that each individual contribute independently out of his experience and insight." And a warning: "When consensus comes under the dominance of conformity, the social process is polluted."
We cannot leave the crowd. We can be the partner. In Asch's room, one honest voice cut errors to a quarter. Online, the partner is whoever says, calmly and early, "I see it differently, and here is why." You do not have to win the room. You only have to make sure that nobody in it is alone.
This week's ask: a sighting. Where did you see the count arrive before the judgment this week, in your own field? A ranking that settled an argument, a number everyone repeated. No names, no shaming. Leave it in the comments (free subscribers can comment) or send it to hello@nanosava.com. Every sighting is read, and the best ones, anonymous unless you say otherwise, will shape later parts.
Sources
- Solomon E. Asch, "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments," in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men, Carnegie Press, 1951. (Cited from the references of source 3; no open copy.)
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